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Active Inference and Cognitive Consistency
Karl J. Friston
The Wellcome Centre for Human Neuroimaging, Institute of Neurology, London, United Kingdom
I know little about social psychology and less about cognitive
consistency theory; however, I greatly enjoyed reading the
deconstruction of this paradigm by Kruglanski et al. (this
issue). I learned a lot and was struck repeatedly by the con-
silience between their treatment and complementary formu-
lations in theoretical neurobiology. The underlying tenets of
their argument emerge—in my world—from a Bayesian or
variational treatment of perception and self-organized
behavior. This is variously known as the free energy prin-
ciple, active inference, predictive processing, or self-evidencing
(Clark, 2013, Friston, 2010; Friston, FitzGerald, Rigoli,
Schwartenbeck, & Pezzulo, 2017; Hohwy, 2016). Particular
flavors of this formulation have dominated cognitive neuro-
science and aspects of philosophy for the past decade. For
example, the Bayesian brain hypothesis (Kersten,
Mamassian, & Yuille, 2004; Knill & Pouget, 2004) and pre-
dictive processing (Barrett & Simmons, 2015; Michael &
De Bruin, 2015; Rao & Ballard 1999; Seth, 2013) are now
predominant paradigms in cognitive neuroscience. Active
inference generalizes this approach to provide an enactive or
embodied treatment of action and perception. This resulting
treatment bears some remarkable similarities to the ideas
reviewed in Kruglanski et al. This commentary tries to
establish the formal links between active inference and con-
structs in cognitive consistency theory in the hope that there
may be some useful cross-fertilisation. In what follows, I
briefly overview active inference with a special focus on the
quantities needed to describe affective responses to new
information and then unpack some key dialectics that speak
to cognitive consistency, epistemic and motivational value,
specific and nonspecific closure, and so on.
Epistemic and Motivational Value in
Active Inference
In brief, active inference explains everything we perceive
and do in terms of one imperative, namely, the minimiza-
tion of variational free energy (Friston, 2013). Variational
free energy is an upper bound on surprise, where surprise
(the negative log probability of sensory samples)
corresponds to negative Bayesian log evidence. This
means that everything we infer (and do) is in the service
of minimizing surprise or maximizing the evidence for
our internal or generative models of the world. By maxi-
mizing the evidence for our models of the world (i.e., self-
evidencing), we come to infer hidden or latent states of
the world “out there” that generate our sensations. This
formulation of “perception as inference” has a long pedi-
gree and was arguably best articulated by Helmholtz
(Helmholtz, 1878/1971): “Objects are always imagined as
being present in the field of vision as would have to be
there in order to produce the same impression on the ner-
vous mechanism.”
Crucially, in active inference, we also have to consider
beliefs about action or behavior. These (posterior) beliefs
depend upon the degree to which a course of action will
minimize expected free energy in the future. The notion of
expected free energy, given a particular action, is key here.
This follows because expected surprise corresponds to
uncertainty. This means that everything we do is in the
game of resolving uncertainty or ambiguity about states of
affairs “out there,” that is, beyond our sensory impressions.
These states of affairs are often referred to as hidden or
latent states because they cannot be observed directly, only
inferred on the basis of observations or sensory evidence.
Technically, free energy can always be expressed as a
divergence minus log evidence. This means that minimizing
free energy reduces the divergence or difference between
our current belief and the true posterior belief (because
beliefs cannot change sensory evidence). In other words, our
beliefs about states of the world are as close as possible to
the true state of affairs, given the sensory evidence at hand.1
Based on these beliefs, we can then form beliefs about “what
to do” by choosing those actions that minimize expected
free energy. The important move here is to separate the
divergence and evidence parts of free energy and understand
what their expected values mean. It turns out that they cor-
respond to epistemic and pragmatic (i.e., motivational) value
respectively. This is remarkable because exactly the same
separation emerges from the treatment of cognitive
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consistency, namely, into epistemic and motivational value.
Furthermore, these two components appear to underpin
nonspecific and specific closure. In other words, the maxi-
mization of epistemic value offers a formal description of
nonspecific closure, whereas the maximization of motiv-
ational (pragmatic) value corresponds to specific closure.
The mathematical form of this separation can be
expressed in terms beliefs Q about states of the world and
choices or policies, where beliefs about states of the world
under a particular policy minimize free energy F, whereas
beliefs about policies minimize expected free energy G:
Q ss; pð Þ ¼ Q ssjpð ÞQ pð Þ
Q ssjpð Þ ¼ arg minQF
F pð Þ ¼ D Q ssjpð ÞjjP ssjeo; pð Þ½ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Divergence
 ln P eojpð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
log evidence
Q pð Þ ¼ exp c 
X
s
G p; sð Þ
h i
G p; sð Þ ¼ D Q ssjos; pð Þjj lnQ ssjpð Þ½ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Epistemic value
E lnP osjpð Þ½ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Motivational value
(1)
Equation 1 provides a detailed description of these math-
ematical expressions for readers familiar with Bayesian or
variational treatments. The variable c is a constant of pro-
portionality that will play an important role later in terms of
affective responses to beliefs about action.
Pragmatic value acquires the semantic “motivational”
because it is the expected log probability of prior beliefs
about outcomes. In other words, if we treat beliefs about the
consequences of behavior as prior preferences, then we will
choose those behaviors that lead to goals or preferred out-
comes. However, this is always in the context of reducing
uncertainty (that can be also expressed in terms of ambigu-
ity and risk; see Equation A.1 in the appendix). This is the
epistemic part of expected free energy—variously known as
Bayesian surprise, information gain, the value of informa-
tion, intrinsic motivation, and so on (see Equation 1). In
summary, the interaction between motivational and epi-
stemic value appears to underpin the deconstruction of cog-
nitive consistency and plays a central role in active
inference. Note that pragmatic and epistemic values are log
probabilities. This means that there is exactly the same sort
of interaction in terms of probabilities per se suggested by
Kruglanski et al. (this issue). In other words, our prior pref-
erences contextualize attempts to resolve uncertainty. So
how can this formalism used to understand “the affective
response to new information” and, more specifically, how
does it address “people’s reactions to awkward news”
(Kruglanski et al., this issue, p. 54)?
The important thing that active inference brings to the
table is the distinction between beliefs about states of the
world and beliefs about “what I am going to do.” Expected
free energy is a functional2 of beliefs about states of the
world and therefore determines (posterior) beliefs about
“what to do” based on motivational (pragmatic) and epi-
stemic value. So where does the affective bit come in?
Generally, people describe affective or hedonic attributes to
the beliefs about “what to do,” as opposed to the “states of
affairs.” In particular, a positive valence is associated with
precise, confident (low entropy) beliefs about action, and
conversely, negative affect is associated with uncertainty and
confusion about what to do next (Gu, Hof, Friston, & Fan,
2013; Seth & Friston, 2016). This distinction between beliefs
about states and beliefs about action comfortably accommo-
dates the key dialectics in the target article, as follows.
Trivial and Nontrivial Inconsistency
First, it distinguishes between trivial and nontrivial inconsis-
tencies, in the sense that trivial inconsistencies can be asso-
ciated with belief updates about latent states of the world
and nontrivial inconsistencies change beliefs about behavior,
“that is, relevant to individuals’ goals in the situation”
(Kruglanski et al., this issue, p. 54). Furthermore, a separ-
ation into beliefs about states and action offer a simple def-
inition of consistency namely, the confidence or precision of
beliefs about behavior. In other words, a consistent belief
about what to do identifies one course of action unambigu-
ously over all plausible alternatives. Conversely, inconsist-
ency corresponds to an uncertainty about what to do that is
generally associated with negative affect and—in the context
of interoceptive inference—stress, anxiety, and negative
emotion (Peters, McEwen, & Friston, 2017; Seth, 2013;
Stephan et al., 2016).
The interesting thing about associating inconsistency with
uncertainty about policies to pursue is that inconsistency
becomes proportional to the free energy expected under the
policies entertained. Mathematically, this can be expressed
as follows:
=p ¼ H Q pð Þ½  ¼ EQ pð Þ  lnQ pð Þ½  ¼ c  EQ pð Þ
P
sG p; sð Þ
 
(2)
This is remarkable because it is exactly the conclusion
offered by Kruglanski et al. (this issue), namely, goal-sensi-
tive or deliberative inconsistency is not a universal con-
struct; it is composed of motivational and epistemic
components that contextualize one another. Often, these
imperatives can be in opposition. Indeed, a ubiquitous pat-
tern of behavior—seen when simulating active inference—is
that epistemic imperatives predominate initially, even at the
expense of securing preferred outcomes. Only when the con-
text has been explored sufficiently—and its epistemic value
has been exhausted—do (synthetic) subjects exploit their
epistemic foraging to pursue preferred outcomes (Friston
et al., 2015; Moulin & Souchay 2015).
Note that this construction necessarily implies that we
will try to avoid bad news because we are inherently opti-
mistic (Sharot, 2011; Sharot, Guitart-Masip, Korn,
Chowdhury, & Dolan, 2012). This optimism is a necessary
aspect of ideal Bayesian (active) inference, in which subjects
make choices that are most likely given the sort of subject2A function of a function; in this case, a function of a probability distribution
68 COMMENTARIES
they are (Friston et al., 2015). Because the posterior prob-
ability of a choice rests upon prior beliefs, these prior beliefs
bias everything we do. Any epistemic foraging (i.e., informa-
tion seeking) that that leads to highly unlikely outcomes will
therefore not be entertained; for example, we do not seek
medical information that leads to a course of action that is
so unlikely it is not worth contemplating, namely, dying.
Before turning to some of the implications in terms of
affective responses to good and bad information, there is
one interesting corollary that endorses the arguments in
Kruglanski et al. (this issue)—and allows us to showcase the
advantages of formal treatments, like active inference. In
brief, the constant of proportionality c above itself has a
Bayes optimal (free energy minimizing) solution that turns
out to be proportional to cognitive consistency [this can be
written mathematically as follows by substituting Equation






This is important because this constant of proportionality
behaves in a way that has all the hallmarks of dopaminergic
responses in real brains (Friston et al., 2014). This speaks to
the neuromodulatory correlates of affective reactions to
changes in cognitive consistency—and shows how formal
treatments can link concepts in social psychology to neuro-
biological processes. In short, it suggests that whenever there
is an increase in epistemic or motivational value during
active inference, there will be an increase in consistency that
will be reported by increases in dopamine activity. See
Figure 1 for an example of phasic dopamine responses to
epistemic and motivational value. Indeed, there is an emerg-
ing literature on the link between dopaminergic activity, in
this setting, that may be usefully migrated to social psych-
ology (Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, & Friston,
2015). Although promising, this formulation of consist-
ency—as the impact of new information on confidence
about what to do—does not explain our responses to good
and bad news (Kruglanski et al., this issue). Or does it?
Affective Responses and Closure
On the preceding arguments, a negative effective response to
bad news would imply that new evidence induces posterior
beliefs about the state of the world that induce uncertainty
about the course of action. This seems sensible: For
example, when opening a letter that contains exam results,
one would imagine that this epistemic foraging is driven by
the epistemic value (i.e., resolution of uncertainty) about
your performance and the sort of person you are. If you
have failed, under the belief that you are an overachiever,
the overall consequences can be summarized as “What on
Earth am I to do now?” In short, bad news almost invariably
induces uncertainty about how to realize goals or prior
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Figure 1. This figure illustrates the functional anatomy implied by a simple message passing scheme based on minimizing variational free energy; see Friston et al.
(2014) for details. Note. The variables o, s, and a correspond to observations, expected states of the world, and action, respectively, where p and c represent
expected policies and their precision. G is the expected free energy of policies. The equations corresponds to (variational) Bayesian updates, where A and B are
probability transition matrices, mapping hidden states to observations and hidden states to hidden states under different actions respectively. r is a softmax func-
tion. Here, we have associated the Bayesian updates of hidden states of the world with perception, control states (policies) with action selection and expected preci-
sion with confidence. In this (purely iconic) schematic, we have associated perception (inference about the current state of the world) with the prefrontal cortex,
while assigning action selection to the basal ganglia. Precision has been associated with dopaminergic projections from ventral tegmental area and substantia nigra.
Lower panel: This shows the results of a simulation in terms of simulated dopamine discharges. The key thing to note is that the responses to an informative cue
(CS) pre-empts subsequent responses to the reward (US). In this simulation, the agent was shown a cue that resolved uncertainty (i.e., had epistemic value) about
where to find a reward (i.e., that had motivational value) in a simple T-maze (inset).
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preferences, whereas good news signifies a clear path for-
ward, either in the short or long term. This seems to be a
plausible explanation for our affective responses to new evi-
dence that incorporates both the affective dimension and
the interplay between epistemic affordance and prior prefer-
ences, both in resolving uncertainty and inducing it in terms
of future prospects. There are more nuanced arguments
(that entail the opportunity to resolve uncertainty in the
future) that can be applied to the interesting phenomena of
not wanting to know the end of a book (Kruglanski et al.,
this issue) or the final score of a football match before it is
watched. See Friston, Lin, et al. (2017) for a discussion of
novelty and curiosity in this context.
Conclusion
So is there a universal need for cognitive consistency? In the
preceding view, one would argue that consistency is not the
primary construct: It is an inevitable consequence of form-
ing posterior beliefs about an active engagement with the
world that has epistemic and motivational aspects. This
dual-aspect construction has the latitude to dissociate
(Bayesian) surprise from prior preference [see Equation (1)],
providing an accommodating account of pleasant and
unpleasant surprises. For example, the state of mind on
opening a gift can place motivational and epistemic impera-
tives in opposition. Both will reduce uncertainty and afford
Bayesian surprise (i.e., be informative); however, the out-
come (i.e., the gift) may or may not be what you expected
(i.e., preferred). Before closing, I wanted to briefly mention
other prescient points of contact between active inference
and the Kruglanski et al. (this issue) account.
It strikes me that “a reluctance to face ambiguity and
uncertainty” (Kruglanski et al., this issue, p. 51) fits comfort-
ably within the epistemic value of certain actions—and the
overall propensity to minimize surprise (entailed by the free
energy principle). The degree to which one person or
another expresses a need for nonspecific closure may trans-
late into the degree to which they, a priori, weight epistemic
against pragmatic imperatives. This speaks to characterizing
phenotypic traits in terms of priors, which is a prominent
direction of research in things like computational psychiatry
(Huys, Moutoussis, & Williams, 2011; Wang &
Krystal, 2014).
I was also taken with the notion of self-verification. This
seems to be almost isomorphic to self-evidencing in its
broadest sense (Hohwy, 2016). This becomes particularly
interesting in relation to understanding certain psychiatric
syndromes. For example, the explanation for depression as
self-verification or self-evidencing—in the context of prior
beliefs about adverse consequences of behavior—fits per-
fectly with current formulations of depression in terms of
false inference (Stephan et al., 2016). In short, “individuals
with such low self-esteem (e.g., depressed people) search for
and prefer negative feedback consistent with their self-view”
(Kruglanski et al., this issue, p. 51). This reduces uncertainty
about their engagement with the (prosocial) world. There
are clear metaphors for this in the behavioral psychology lit-
erature, for example, learned helplessness (Hammack,
Cooper, & Lezak, 2012; Stephan et al., 2016).
In closing, I refer interested readers to Table 1 and
Figure 2 for a summary of the similarity between the para-
digm in the target article and active inference. Table 1
attempts to map the concepts and terms used in cognitive
consistency theory with the corresponding constructs in
active inference. The corresponding process theories are
sketched out in Figure 2 using the same format as in
Kruglanski et al. (this issue). As intimated in the closing
comments of Kruglanski et al., these theoretical formulations
will only prove themselves in terms of their predictive
Table 1. The construct validity of cognitive consistency and constructs in active inference.
The social Psychology Paradigm Mathematical Expression The Free Energy Principle Short Description
Cognitive inconsistency = ¼ H½Qðs;pÞ Posterior uncertainty about states
and policies
Confidence or certainty about hidden
states and policies generat-
ing outcomes
Trivial inconsistency =s ¼ H½QðsÞ Posterior uncertainty about states A loss of confidence in beliefs about
hidden states of the world
Nontrivial inconsistency =p ¼ H½QðpÞ Posterior uncertainty about policies A loss of confidence about what to do
(usually associated with stress
and anxiety)
Motivational value EfQ ½ln PðosjpÞ Pragmatic value The expected log likelihood (i.e. prior
preferences) of outcomes in the future
Epistemic value EfQ ½lnQðssjos;pÞ  lnQðssjpÞ Epistemic value The information gain, reduction of
uncertainty, intrinsic motivation or epi-
stemic affordance of a policy
Specific closure Maximisation of pragmatic value Selection of policies that optimise the
motivational component of expected
free energy
Nonspecific closure Maximisation of epistemic value Selection of policies that optimise the
epistemic component of expected
free energy
Self-verification QðpÞ ¼ expðc  GðpÞÞ Self-evidencing Selection of policies that maximise
expected model evidence or minimise
expected free energy
Affective reaction c ¼ 1=pb The precision of beliefs about policies The consequences of Bayesian belief
updating on the confidence placed
in policies
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validity. In this regard, there are some interesting paradigms
that are emerging from the active inference literature that
could be scrutinized from the perspective of social psych-
ology. I have in mind here explicit tests of choice behavior
when motivational and epistemic imperatives are set in
opposition. One might even imagine the study of the neur-
onal correlates of belief updating—along the lines of the
dopaminergic responses just described (Schwartenbeck,
FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, & Friston, 2015).
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Appendix
Active Inference and Self-Evidencing
Active inference is based on the premise that creatures (like us) min-
imize variational free energy. This single premise leads to some surpris-
ingly simple update rules for action, perception, policy selection, and
the encoding of uncertainty or precision. The active inference scheme
described here can be applied to any paradigm or choice behavior. It
has been used to model waiting games (Friston et al., 2013), two-step
maze tasks (Friston et al., 2015), the urn task and evidence accumula-
tion (FitzGerald, Schwartenbeck, Moutoussis, Dolan, & Friston, 2015),
trust games from behavioral economics (Moutoussis, Trujillo-Barreto,
El-Deredy, Dolan, & Friston, 2014), addictive behavior (Schwartenbeck,
FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, Wurst, et al., 2015), and engineering bench-
marks such as the mountain car problem. It has also been used in the
setting of computational functional magnetic resonance imaging
(Schwartenbeck, FitzGerald, Mathys, Dolan, Wurst, et al., 2015).
Active Inference and Generative Models
Active inference rests on a generative model of observed outcomes.
This model is used to infer the most likely causes of outcomes in terms
of expectations about states of the world. These states are called hidden
states because they can only be inferred indirectly through, possibly
limited, sensory observations. Crucially, observations depend on action,
which requires the generative model to entertain expectations under
different policies or action sequences. Because the model generates the
consequences of sequential action, it has explicit representations of the
past and future; in other words, it is equipped with a working memory
and expectations about future (counterfactual) states of the world
under competing policies. These expectations are optimized by mini-
mizing variational free energy, which renders them (approximately) the
most likely (posterior) expectations about states of the world, given the
current observations.
Expectations or beliefs about the most likely policy are based on
the prior belief that policies are more likely if they pursue a trajectory
or path that has the least free energy (or greatest model evidence). As
we see next, this expected free energy can be expressed in terms of epi-
stemic and motivational all pragmatic value, where epistemic value
scores the information gain or reduction in uncertainty about states of
the world and motivational value depends on prior beliefs about future
outcomes. These prior preferences play the role of utility in economics
and reinforcement learning.
Having evaluated the relative probability of different policies,
expectations under each policy can then be averaged in proportion to
their (posterior) probability. In statistics, this is known as Bayesian
model averaging. The results of this averaging specify the next most
likely outcome, which determines the next action. Once an action has
been selected, it generates a new outcome and the (perception and
action) cycle starts again. The resulting behavior is a principled interro-
gation and sampling of sensory cues that has both epistemic and moti-
vated aspects. Generally, behavior in an ambiguous context is
dominated by epistemic drives until there is no further uncertainty to
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resolve—and extrinsic value predominates. At this point, explorative
behavior gives way to exploitative behavior.
In short, perception and action are subsumed under planning as infer-
ence (Attias, 2003; Botvinick & Toussaint, 2012; Toussaint & Storkey,
2006). Formally, this corresponds to inverting or fitting a generative
model, given a sequence of outcomes. Technically, this is equivalent to
optimizing the expected hidden states, policies, and precision with respect
to variational free energy. These (posterior) estimates constitute posterior
beliefs, usually denoted by the probability distribution QðxÞ, where x ¼es; p; c are the hidden or unknown variables.
Variational Free Energy and Inference
In variational Bayesian inference, model inversion entails minimizing
variational free energy with respect to the sufficient statistics (i.e.,
expectations) of posterior beliefs:
Q xð Þ¼argminQ xð ÞF
F¼EQ lnQ xð ÞlnP eojxð ÞlnP xð Þ 
¼EQ lnQ xð ÞlnP xjeoð ÞlnP eoð Þ 
¼D Q xð ÞjjP xjeoð Þ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Divergence
 lnP eoð Þ|ﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄ}
logevidence
¼D Q xð ÞjjP xð Þ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Complexity
EQ lnP eojxð Þ½ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Accuracy
(A.1)
where eo¼ðo1;:::;otÞ denotes observations up until the current time.
Because the Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence cannot be less than
zero, the penultimate equality means that free energy is minimized
when the approximate posterior becomes the true posterior. At this
point, the free energy becomes the negative log evidence for the gen-
erative model (Beal, 2003). This means minimizing free energy is
equivalent to maximizing model evidence, which is equivalent to mini-
mizing the complexity of accurate explanations for observed outcomes
(last equality in B.1).
Minimizing free energy ensures expectations encode posterior
beliefs, given observed outcomes. However, beliefs about policies rest
on future outcomes. This means that policies should, a priori, minim-
ize the free energy in the future. This can be formalized by making the
log probability of a policy proportional to the free energy expected in
the future (Friston et al., 2015):
Q pð Þ ¼ exp c  G pð Þð Þ
G pð Þ ¼ PsG p; sð Þ
G p; sð Þ ¼ E
Qe lnQ ssjpð Þ lnQ ssjos;pð Þ ln P osð Þ
 
¼ D Q ssjos;pð ÞjjQ ssjpð Þ½ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Epistemicvalue
EeQ ln P osð Þ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Pragmatic value




þEeQ H P osjssð Þ½ ½ |ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
Ambiguity
(A.2)
where eQ ¼ Qðos; ssjpÞ ¼ PðosjssÞQðssjpÞ.
The expected divergence now becomes mutual information or epi-
stemic value, whereas the expected log-evidence becomes motivational
value—if we associate the prior preferences with value or utility. The
final expression shows how expected free energy can be evaluated rela-
tively easily: It is just the divergence between the predicted and pre-
ferred outcomes, plus the ambiguity (i.e., entropy) expected under
predicted states.
There are several helpful interpretations of expected free energy
that appeal to (and contextualize) established constructs. For
example, maximizing epistemic value is equivalent to maximizing
(expected) Bayesian surprise (Itti & Baldi, 2009), where Bayesian
surprise is the KL divergence between posterior and prior beliefs.
This can also be interpreted in terms of the principle of maximum
mutual information or minimum redundancy (Barlow, 1961;
Laughlin, 2001; Linsker, 1990; Olshausen & Field, 1996). This is
because epistemic value is the mutual information between hidden
states and observations. In other words, it reports the reduction in
uncertainty about hidden states afforded by observations. Because
the information gain cannot be less than zero, it disappears when
the (predictive) posterior ceases to be informed by new observa-
tions. Heuristically, this means that epistemic behavior will search
out observations that resolve uncertainty about the state of the
world (e.g., foraging to resolve uncertainty about the hidden loca-
tion of prey or fixating on informative part of a face). However,
when there is no posterior uncertainty—and the agent is confident
about the state of the world—there can be no further information
gain, and epistemic value will be the same for all policies, enabling
extrinsic value to dominate. This resolution of uncertainty is closely
related to satisfying artificial curiosity (Schmidhuber, 1991; Still &
Precup, 2012) and speaks to the value of information
(Howard, 1966).
The risk (i.e., expected complexity) is exactly the same quantity
minimized in risk sensitive or KL control (Klyubin, Polani, &
Nehaniv, 2005; van den Broek, Wiegerinck, & Kappen, 2010), and
underpins related (free energy) formulations of bounded rationality
based on complexity costs (Braun, Ortega, Theodorou, & Schaal,
2011; Ortega & Braun, 2013). In other words, minimizing expected
complexity or cost renders behavior risk sensitive, and maximizing
expected accuracy induces ambiguity-sensitive behavior.
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